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Over the past few decades the internationalization of media has transformed the world 
is which we live.  Brought on by both the technological revolution and globalization, this 
change has proven to have two significant and conflicting consequences.  On one hand, it has 
had the power to bring people together.  Today Indonesians with satellite television can 
watch Saudi Arabian coverage of the hajj and attempt to spot their kin from the masses 
encircling the Ka’ba.  Meanwhile, farmers in Afghanistan can read a newspaper online, learn 
about the struggles of South American farmers and begin to empathize with their hardships.  
On the other hand, this transformation has had the power to tear the people apart.  Events in 
one corner of the earth can spark the masses of another into upheaval.  One culture’s value of 
free speech is another’s irreverence of God; cartoons in one place are blasphemy in another.  
For better and for worse, instances like these that have begun to influence the worldviews of 
people throughout the world.  And, alas, it is the latter of the two hands that grips the 
headlines of the new internationalized media.  Although instances of the media’s power to 
divide people are bountiful, it is toward one example that we shall focus our attention: the 
recent controversy surrounding the Danish caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed and, 
particularly, how the crisis unfolded in Oman. 
 
I. The Caricatures and the Controversy Beyond Oman 
The cartoons were first published in the small Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 
30 September 2005 as the winners of a competition.  The contest arose after Kare Bluitgen, a 
Danish children’s author, complained that he could not find an artist to depict the Prophet 
Mohammed in his upcoming illustrated book, because no one was willing to disobey the 
Muslim conviction prohibiting images of the Prophet.1  In response to this call, the editorial 
board of Jyllands-Posten wrote that “we are on our way to a slippery slope where no-one can 
                                                 
1 Asser, Martin.  “What the Muhammed cartoons portray.”  9 February 2006.  BBC News Online. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4693292.stm> 24 March 2006. 
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tell how the self-censorship will end.”2  Jyllands-Posten then invited “cartoonists to ‘draw 
the Prophet as they saw him,’ as assertion of free speech and to reject the pressure by Muslim 
groups to respect their sensitivities.”3  With this the floodgates opened and depictions of the 
Prophet poured in.  In the end, 12 cartoons were published in the Jyllands-Posten; some 
being highly insulting, such as one portraying the Prophet Mohammed as a sword wilding 
assassin, and others being more humorous, such as one mocking Bluitgen for using the 
contest as a public relations stunt.4  Nevertheless, all were artistic renditions of the Prophet 
himself and thus in violation of Muslim conviction.   
The caricatures immediately received an outcry from Muslim leaders in Denmark; 
however, they yielded little response from the rest of the Muslim world.5  In fact, on 17 
October 2005 the Egyptian weekly Al-Farj republished six of the cartoons, wrote an article 
condemning them and predicted a public outcry.  Despite this prediction and it being the first 
time the cartoons were published in the Muslim world, they stirred up little public response.6  
They did, however, move ten ambassadors from Muslim countries to complain to the Danish 
Prime Minister on 20 October.7  For the cartoons to receive the public outcry Al-Farj 
anticipated would require a much more conscious effort on behalf of Muslim leaders in 
Denmark.  It would require sharing their concerns to the leaders of the Muslim world. 
Following the faint public reaction to the cartoons in Egypt, a group of Islamic leaders 
in Denmark decided to internationalize the issue.  During the proceeding months a delegation 
of Danish Muslims went to the Middle East to meet with the region’s religious and political 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Reynolds, Paul.  “Cartoons: Divisions and inconsistencies.”  BBC News Online.  13 February 2006. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4708216.stm> March 24, 2006. 
6 Slackman, Michael and Hassan M Fattah.  “Furor Over Cartoons Pits Muslim Against Muslim.”  22 
February 2006.  The New York Times, pp. A1. 
7 “Muslim cartoon row timeline.”  19 February 2006.  BBC News Online.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4688602.stm> March 24, 2006. 
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leaders.8  The delegation brought with them a 43-page dossier discussing the treatment of 
Muslims and their religion in Denmark.9  Within this document was a critical overview of 
Denmark’s treatment of Islam, including the 12 cartoons originally published in the Jyllands-
Posten in late September and, in addition to these, three extra, fraudulent10 cartoons that it 
claimed depicted the Prophet Mohammed.11  These three additional cartoons were 
significantly more derogatory and hateful than the original dozen published in the Danish 
newspaper.  The delegation found a ready audience for their case in the Middle East and their 
pamphlet quickly spread throughout the region.   
After weeks of lobbying public leaders in the Middle East, the delegation would find 
their issue catapult into the international spotlight by a single statement.  Their efforts landed 
the 43-page dossier in the hands of those attending the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference’s (OIC) December summit in Mecca.  Although the issue was not on the agenda 
of the summit, the OIC released a statement on 6 December condemning the cartoons, 
claiming that people were using the freedom of expression as a pretext to defame religion and 
calling for the United Nations (UN) to sanction Denmark.12  With this statement the issue 
arose on the international scene.  Following the OIC condemnation outrage in Muslim states 
became more public and the issue began to get coverage on state television stations.13  
Although the statement alone did not mark the beginning of the international protest 
                                                 
8 Reynolds, Paul.   
9 Full-text of the dossier is available on Wikipedia.org, see:  
“Akkari-Laban dossier.”  Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.  2006.  Wikipedia Online.  5 May 
2006.  <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akkari-Laban_dossier> 
10 Numerous sources have suggested that one of the most widely circulated cartoons -- often referred 
to as the “pig cartoon” -- was, in fact, originally published in a French newspaper some years 
ago mocking a contestant in a pig squealing contest that is held each summer.  See 
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8959820> for the original story.  
11 Reynolds, Paul.  “A clash of rights and responsibilities.”  BBC News Online.  6 February 2006. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4686536.stm>  27 March 2006. 
12 Fattah, Hassan M. “At Mecca Meeting, Cartoon Outrage Cystallized.”  8 February 2006.  The New 
York Times.  pp. A1. 
13 Ibid. 
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movement, it did immediately internationalize the issue and bring it to the attention of the 
Muslim masses.  Over time the issue began to spiral out of control.  
Protests soon erupted from Morocco to Indonesia.  On 26 January 2005 the political 
cataclysm began when Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador to Denmark and Libya closed its 
embassy in Copenhagen.  Four days later, the European Union’s (EU) office in Gaza was 
raided by gunmen demanding an apology for the publication of the cartoons.  On the 31 
January the Jyllands-Posten apologized for the cartoons, while the Danish Prime Minister 
defended the right to freedom of expression.   The following day newspapers in France, Italy, 
Spain and Germany republish the caricatures to assert their right to free speech.  This initiated 
a pattern of republication and reaction, which became increasingly violent over time.  On 4 
and 5 February, the Danish embassies in Damascus and Beirut, respectively, were attacked by 
angered masses.  In Beirut the Danish embassy, along with its Norwegian cohabitant, was 
burnt down.  The next day the protests began to claim lives as five people died in protests in 
Pakistan and one in Somalia.  The Iranian government then cut all ties to Denmark as 
protesters assaulted the Danish embassy in Tehran, subsequently prompting the Iranian 
newspaper Hamshahri to commence a mock contest where artists submitted cartoons 
portraying the Holocaust, Israel and America. 14  This pattern continued throughout the rest of 
the month of February resulting in a political, economic and social crisis, deepening the 
chasm between the Western and Western worlds. 
The events that took place unleashed many of the underlying tensions in various parts 
of the world.  In many places the controversy caused social friction to erupt.  Perhaps the 
worst instance of this was in Nigeria, where outrage over the cartoon resulted in feudal 
                                                 
14 All information for this paragraph was taken from: “Muslim cartoon row timeline.”  19 February 
2006.  BBC News Online.  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4688602.stm>.   
-This site has a timeline showing many of the significant events in the cartoon crisis. 
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violence.15  Christians in southern Nigeria slaughtered over 100 Muslims in retaliation to the 
murder of 18 Ibos Christians by Muslims infuriated by the cartoons in the northern part of the 
country.16  For days there was death and destruction as Muslims and Christians burned each 
others’ homes, businesses, mosques and churches.   
The controversy has also provided ammunition to Muslim extremist groups.  In Syria 
and Iran, for example, many groups have used the cartoons as justification for the perception 
that the Western world is anti-Islamic and have tried to manipulate the issue to compliment 
their political ambitions.17  In Lebanon on 9 February a Shiite ceremony turned into a 
political display as thousands showed to protest the cartoons.18  Thus the controversy has 
underscored the contest between opposition movements and their governments.19  Sadly, the 
degree of the violence in the protest movement suggests that these groups have been quite 
successful in their efforts. 
The fallout of the cartoon crisis has also revealed two characteristics about 
relationships among religions.  Firstly, it has revealed that the international religious 
community has the ability to unite.  A diverse array of religious leaders -- from the Pope to 
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani -- have unanimously renounced violence and called for a 
peaceful response to the cartoons.  Secondly, the reaction has shown that the Muslim world 
has the ability to overcome its sectarian differences in the face of a threat to Islam.  During a 
Friday sermon at the Grand Mosque in the holy city of Mecca, the Saudi preacher Saleh bin 
Humaid praised this newfound unity by saying “A great new spirit is flowing through the 
                                                 
15 Polgreen, Lydia.  “Nigeria Counts 100 Deaths Over Danish Caricatures.”  24 February 2006.  The 
New York Times, pp. A8. 
16 Ibid. 
17 “Mutual incomprehension, mutual outrage – Islam and free speech.”  11 February 2006.  The 
Economist, Special Report: US Edition. 
18 “Muslim cartoon row timeline.” 
19 Slackman, Michael and Hassan M Fattah. 
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body of the Islamic nation.  The world can no longer ignore the nation and its feelings.”20  
Nevertheless, calls by religious leadership for calm have proved to have little sway over the 
masses; the violent response seemed to be out of their control.  
The crisis has also received a noteworthy response from both Western and Muslim 
governments.  The response from Western governments was remarkably uniform.  Most, 
including the US and Britain, have claimed that freedom of expressions is a right that comes 
with the responsibility to respect differences.  In the West, some public opinion leaders 
retorted this by claiming that their governments failed to stand up for their fundamental 
beliefs by not asserting the artists’ and newspapers’ rights to freedom of expression.  
However, it seems that this response was aimed at giving Muslim moderates evidence that 
free speech is compatible with Islamic beliefs, thereby discrediting the position of Muslim 
extremists.  In this sense Western governments used the issue as an opportunity to distinguish 
between Muslims who violently and peacefully responded to the controversy.21  By 
encouraging a moderate reaction Western governments hoped to lessen the perception that 
this crisis was clash of civilizations.   
Even more significant were the Muslim governments’ responses to the crisis.  
Throughout these states the prevailing trend was to increase censorship of the media.  Some 
pundits have suggested that many of the Arab regimes used these policies to establish their 
religious credentials.22  In Jordan, for example, King Abdullah responded so harshly to the 
republication of the cartoons in his nation that it threw back his allies.  He claimed to be 
especially offended by the publications because of his direct descendence from the Prophet.23  
In Saudi Arabia an entire newspaper was shutdown for reprinting a selection of the 
                                                 
20 “Mutual incomprehension, mutual outrage – Islam and free speech.” 
21 Reynolds, Paul.  “A clash of rights and responsibilities.”  
22 Slackman, Michael and Hassan M Fattah. 
23 Ibid. 
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cartoons.24  In the end, eleven journalists in five different Muslim countries faced prosecution 
for publishing the cartoons.25  Some scholars have also suggested that the controversy gave 
regimes justification for cracking down on Islamist opposition groups.26  With the upheaval 
escalating, authoritarian regimes had an ideal opportunity to suppress their opposition in a 
manner that both suited Western interests and their own survival.  Other experts have 
maintained that the same governments used the controversy as a scapegoat from domestic 
ills.27  It provided an opportunity to refocus popular discontent on external enemies and away 
from a regime’s failure to address issues such as unemployment and education.  In sum, the 
Muslim regimes saw the media as fueling popular furor, providing justification for Muslim 
extremism and degrading Islam.  Increasing censorship of the media was thus a win-win 
policy for Muslim governments.   
The Muslim popular response to the cartoons was ultimately a boycott of Danish 
goods.  In terms of popular participation the boycott was a resounding success.  Arla Foods, a 
Danish diary company said that the boycott had been “nearly total.”28  At the height of the 
boycott Arla Foods claimed to be loosing $1.5 million a day in exports to the Middle East.  
The tumultuous business environment caught Danish companies off guard.  Unlike American 
businesses, Danish companies are not accustom to international pressure and struggled to 
adapt to the Muslim boycott.29  Many companies initially ran full-page advertisements in 
Middle Eastern newspapers asserting that Denmark respects all religions.  This strategy 
quickly proved to be counterproductive by helping boycotters identify potential targets; 
                                                 
24 Usher, Sebastian.  “Saudi paper ‘shut’ in cartoon row.”  20 February 2006.  BBC News Online.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4734500.stm> 5 May 2006. 
25 Slackman, Michael and Hassan M Fattah. 
26 Qureshi, Emran. “The Islam the Riots Drowned Out.” 12 February 2006. The New York Times, pp. 
D1. 
27 Friedman, Thomas. “Empty Pockets, Angry Minds.” 22 February 2006.  The New York Times, pp. 
A19 
28 Pfanner, Eric.  “Danish Companies Endure Snub by Muslim Consumers.”  27 February 2006.  The 
New York Times, pp. C1. 
29 Ibid.  
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therefore, companies began to take a low profile by removing logos and advertisements from 
products and publications throughout the Muslim world.30  Perhaps the hardest hit company 
was Kuwaiti Danish Dairy.  Although the company has not had an affiliation with Denmark 
for decades and is completely Kuwaiti owned and operated, the company’s sales fell by 95% 
in some markets.31  It is also worth noting that some sectors of the Danish economy -- such as 
shipping and other services that do not directly interact with consumers -- have not been 
affected by the Muslim boycott.  
All this evidence suggests that there was not one ultimate authority orchestrating the 
boycott, but rather that the campaign was largely conducted by individuals acting on their 
own personal convictions.  This was most apparent in the quality of goods that were 
boycotted.  These products tended to be consumer goods from companies with clear 
affiliations to Denmark.  The most evident example of this was the substantial drop in sales 
felt by the Muslim company Kuwaiti Danish Dairy.  From this perspective, the campaign did 
not seem to have the direction that comes with a well-defined leadership.  For this reason I 
believe the controversy and the response it received says more about the personal convictions 
and values of individuals in the Muslim world than it does about the ability of organizations 
to galvanize the masses.  Therefore, by studying the crisis in Oman we can shed light on 
some aspects of both the relationship between the Muslim and Western worlds and the inner-
workings of Omani society.  However, before we can venture toward the case at hand it is 
necessary to locate this study within a greater context.  It is only after understanding the 
dynamics at work during past incidents that can one view the recent controversy in its 
entirety.   
 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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II.  Contextualizing the Controversy 
 Although the controversy over the Danish cartoons caught many off guard, there is a 
long and rich literature concerning the factors influencing such events and similar crisis that 
have occurred in the past.  Much of this literature deals with the technological and 
information revolutions and how they are politically, socially and culturally transforming the 
world in which we live.  There is also a great deal of information available pertaining to the 
nature of Islamic art and the prohibition of representations of the Prophet Mohammed and 
God.  In addition to this, the Muslim world has been outraged, often galvanized, by the 
treatment of their religion in the Western world many times in the past and a significant 
amount scholarship has emerged to assess these particular cases.  It is therefore necessary to 
consider and understand this body of information before we can come to view the recent 
controversy in the appropriate context.  
 One of the most researched topics relating to this controversy is the impact of the 
technological and information revolutions on the Muslim world.  The full scope of this topic 
transcends the breadth of this essay; however, certain aspects of this scholarship can vastly 
contribute to our understanding of the issue at hand.  The most fundamental consequence of 
this transformation is that as new communications technology becomes available to 
consumers of all backgrounds, the old asymmetrical balance of communication technology 
between the state and the public is reversed.32  Innovations such as faxes, compact discs and 
video-recorders permit individuals to become the disseminators and makers of information, 
not mere recipients.  Thus state monopolies on the flow of information are diminishing and 
individuals are becoming increasingly globally conscious and interconnected.  Information no 
                                                 
32 Eickelman, Dale F. and Jon W. Anderson.  1999.  “Redefining Muslim Publics,” pp. 1-18 in:  Dale 
F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (Eds.)  New Media in the Muslim World: The emerging 
Public Sphere.  Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.  p2. 
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longer flows vertically from a decision-making elite to the masses of society, but rather 
horizontally within the masses themselves.33   
 The proliferation of this information technology has subsequently transformed the 
characteristics of Muslim publics throughout the world.  By undercutting traditional 
conceptions of authority it allows the masses to determine what it means to be and live as a 
Muslim does in a modern world.  As shown by Dale Eickelman, the proliferation of this 
technology is “among other consequences, helping to alter the way large numbers of 
Muslims, in [rural Oman] and elsewhere, think about themselves, their religion and their 
politics.”34  Individuals are no longer solely embracing the beliefs espoused by religious and 
political authority, but instead are becoming increasingly aware of contemporary issues and 
interpreting them in their own personal manner.  The spread of modern technology and 
information and the ensuing collapse of traditional structures of religious authority prompt 
Eickelman to assert, “Islam has been democratized.”35  Although this may be a premature 
assertion, it is clear that the information and technological revolutions are transforming 
notions of authority. 
 In addition to this, the technological and information revolutions have resulted in the 
internationalization of the media.  Individuals today have access to media sources and ideas 
from all walks of life, are therefore exposed to formerly inaccessible facets of other 
civilizations.  As geographic, linguistic, political and cultural divisions cease to be barriers to 
the flow of information, individuals are forced to rethink their role in both society and the 
                                                 
33 Norton, Augustus Richard.  1999.  “The New Media, Civic Pluralism and the Slowly Retreating 
State,” pp. 19-28 in:  Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (Eds.)  New Media in the 
Muslim World: The emerging Public Sphere.  Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
p21. 
34 Eickelman, Dale F.  1998.  Mass Education, the New Media and Their Implications for Political 
and Religious Authority.  Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and 
Research. p6. 
35 Eickelman; 1998, p14. 
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world.  Populations are consequently becoming more globally conscious.  In regards to the 
impact of this transformation on the Muslim world Eickelman notes:   
A new sense of public is emerging throughout the Muslim-majority states and 
Muslim communities elsewhere.  It is shaped by increasingly open contests 
over the use of symbolic language of Islam.  New and accessible modes of 
communication have made these contests increasingly global, so that even 
local issues take on transnational dimensions.36
 
It is this combination of changing factors -- nature of authority, the flow of and access to 
information and the characteristics of publics -- that has allowed the information and 
technological revolutions to have such great impact on world events.  It is this shift that has 
ultimately made it so that, as Eickelman puts, “local issues take on transnational dimensions.”  
It light of recent events this statement seems to be nearly a fact.  Events in an obscure Danish 
newspaper have brought the masses of the Muslim world to upheaval.  
Although I am not quick to pronounce the triumph of information and technology 
over the hierarchical nature of Muslim religious and political authority, I do believe that this 
assertion beckons further quantification.  An important aspect of this study is, therefore, to 
determine to what extent the attitudes and behavior of individual Muslims concerning the 
controversy was shaped by personal convictions rather than by the direction of authority.  
With this dynamic in mind it becomes important to review the Islamic convictions most 
directly related to the controversy at hand.  
 It is quite apparent that Muslim convictions played a significant role in the events that 
unfolded.  To begin, the cartoons were an immediate violation of Muslim principles in that 
they were artistic renditions of the Prophet Mohammed.  Images are strictly prohibited by the 
Qur’an and pictures of the prophets or God are considered the most severe violation of this 
prohibition.37   Not only were the Danish cartoons images of one of Islam’s holiest figures 
                                                 
36 Eickelman; 1998, p16. 
37 Gocer, Asli.  1999.  “A Hypothesis Concerning the Character of Islamic Art.”  Journal of the 
History of Ideas. Volume 60, Number 4, October 1999, pp. 683-692.  p683.   
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and an infringement of Islamic law, they were also extremely derogatory and insulting to the 
faith as a whole.  However, what accounts for these convictions and gives Islamic art its 
unique character? 
There is a rich scholarship concerning Islamic aesthetics, especially regarding the 
prohibition of images.  As noted above, there are many Qur’anic verses that are use to 
substantiate the claim that images are not permissible; however, only one verse directly 
addresses the issue:  
And [mention, O Muhammad] when Abraham said to his father Azar, “Do you 
take idols as deities?  Indeed, I see you and your people to be in manifest 
error.”  
(6:74)38
 
This verse strikes at the root of the theological prohibition.  It illuminates the fear that such 
images could become the focus of worship and subsequently transform into the deity itself in 
the mind of the beholder.  To the Muslim, figurative representations are to be avoided 
because they run the risk of equating imperfect human creativity with divinity.  This rejection 
of pictorial art is also justified in the belief that the qualities of God must be replicated in 
art.39  Unlike painting and other similar art forms, which are bound to human talent and thus 
error, Islamic art attempts to come as near to perfection as human ability permits.  As a result, 
Muslim art tends to consist of mathematic and natural patterns.  Muslims theoretically justify 
this art form on the basis that artistically producing mathematical perfection is emulating the 
qualities of God.40   
Another Islamic art form is the calligraphy of Qur’anic verses.  Duplicating passages 
of the Qur’an is seen as theologically just because it is reproducing the words of God in an 
                                                                                                                                                        
-The most frequently quoted passages are 34.12, 3.42, 5.92, and 6.74; however, as one scholar 
asserts that these are “post facto justifications” (Gocer; 1999, p692). 
38 The Qur’an: Arabic Text with Corresponding English Meaning.  1997. Abulqasim Publishing 
House.  Translated by Saheeh International: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
39 Gocer; 1999, p690. 
40 Gocer; 1999, p691. 
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eloquent manner.  In calligraphy, as in mathematics, there is minimal room for human 
manipulation and, as a result, minimal potential for error.  As show by Asli Gocer, these 
considerations lead Muslims to conclude that “art that is not theologically reflective is 
metaphysically vacuous and morally pernicious, and hence it has no place in good society.”41  
In Islamic societies, figurative art represents both a potential deviation from and threat to its 
theological pillars.  Consequently, art that most accurately portrays the qualities of God and 
has the least potential for theological deviation is most permissible in Muslim societies.    
 In addition to this, Islamic beliefs regarding the Prophet Mohammed also played a 
significant role the behavior of individuals during the cartoon crisis.  There is a considerably 
large and detailed history concerning the relationship between Muslim principles and the life 
of the Prophet Mohammed.  The Sunna and Hadith, for instance, are both compilations of the 
acts and deeds of the Prophet during his lifetime and are used as primary sources when 
formulating Islamic law.42  The Prophet Mohammed is seen as Islam’s exemplary figure and 
his emulation is regarded as most virtuous.  The exalted life and deeds of the Prophet are 
pillars of Muslim society and the cartoons threatened their credibility.  As with any well-
revered leader, assaults on their character quickly manifest into assaults on the populations 
that follow them.  In light of this it comes as no surprise that the Danish cartoons galvanized 
the Muslim masses.    
Regrettably, this is not the first Western-Muslim debacle.  The record of the Western-
Muslim relationship is as laden with conflict -- military, economic, cultural and otherwise -- 
as nearly any other relationship in history.  For our present purposes it is therefore necessary 
to survey some of the past controversies between the two parties over the propriety of 
expression and the treatment of religion.  From disputes over the Jerry Springer Show to the 
                                                 
41 Gocer; 1999, p690. 
42 Esposito, John L. 1998.  Islam: The Straight Path.  New York, NY; Oxford University Press.  pp 
77.   
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Dutch film Submission (2004), numerous comparisons have been made between past 
controversies and the recent incidents surrounding the Jyllands-Posten cartoons.  Although 
much can be learned from studying each instance, I believe that it is most important for this 
study to focus on the events that are most similar to the recent controversy: impacted by the 
internationalization of the media, Muslim convictions and the environment that they emerged 
into.    
One of the first instances a publication provoking a debate of global scope was in the 
late 1970s.  This was the controversy was surrounding the book Orientalism by Edward 
Said.43  The book itself is the author’s assessment of Middle Eastern studies in the United 
States; yet the controversy it ensued marked a turning point in the nature of the conflict 
between the Muslim world and the West.  As shown by Sadiq Jalal Azm, the debates that 
proceeded were “universal and encompassed all of the globe, transcending geographic, 
cultural and linguistic borders.”44  For the first time Western treatment of the East had caused 
a transnational dispute; however, this controversy never would have rose to such a large 
scope and degree had it not been for the role of the media in internationalizing the issue.  It 
would be nearly ten years before an incident would match the severity of the cataclysm 
caused by Orientalism.   
Perhaps the most similar controversy to the one at hand was the fiasco surrounding 
Salman Rushdie’s book Satanic Verses.  Published in the late 1988, the book suggested that 
during the Prophet Mohammed’s time in Mecca, before the Hijra, he had received a 
revelation from Satan permitting him to compromise with the polytheists of his own tribe.45  
Even though the controversy over this portion of the Sura of the Star is widely acknowledged 
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and dealt with in Muslim scholarship, Rushdie’s rendition of the event received a worldwide 
response.46  The timing of the controversy was also significant.  The book was published both 
at the end of the Cold War and proceeding the UN brokered peace agreement to end the Iran-
Iraq War.  For our present purposes, several aspects of the Rushdie affair are worth further 
consideration.   
Firstly, the media played a profound role in the escalation of the crisis.  Following the 
publication of the novel, the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini came out against it by issuing 
a message to the Muslims of the world which called for the death of Rushdie and his 
publishers.47  Despite the fact that the Iranian press merely called the statement a message 
(payâm), as the story hit the international press two French scholars, Oliver Roy and Gilles 
Kepel, began to write about the issue calling it a fatwa.48  This terminology subsaquently 
spread amongst the international press syndicates, thereby inadvertently transforming the 
issue into a transnational political, cultural and religious crisis.  Although much has been 
made of Khomeini’s statement, the interests it served and the reaction received, one thing 
remains certain: the international media’s treatment of the issue enabled it to demand global 
attention, which perpetuated the crisis.  
Secondly, there was a distinctive response to the Rushdie affair in the Arab world.  
The riots, property destruction, murder and hate speech that occurred in the West, non-Arab 
Muslim states and in states with substantial Arab minorities was non-existent in the Arab 
world.49  There were neither popular calls for the death of Rushdie nor attempts to fulfill 
Khomeini’s “fatwa.”50  The affair never became an issue of the street; popular galvanization 
never occurred.  Above all, in Arab states the debate remained within the intelligentsia.  
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Interestingly enough, much of the Arab non-political elite was in support of Rushdie.  They 
empathized with the hardships he had come under following the publication of his novel and 
understood the religious and political forces at work.  Thus the issue remained largely an elite 
affair in the Arab world.   
Finally, there was a significant interplay between the crisis and Arab politics.  The 
issue emerged on the international scene shortly after the conclusion of both the Iran-Iraq war 
and the Cold War.  With this in mind, some saw Khomeini’s statement as an attempt to 
assume the leadership of Islam in the post-war environment.51  The fact that the crisis was 
perpetuated by the statement of a Shiite political leader caused the issue to fall into the 
context of the Sunni-Shiite dispute.  As a result, it was in the interest of many Sunni Arab 
leaders to downplay the issue, because it decreased the threat that Khomeini would fulfill his 
ambitions.  Additionally, some saw the event as a Zionist-Western ploy to sow Sunni-Shiite 
dissent.  By questioning the sincerity of Mohammed’s intentions some Sunni Muslims 
perceived the novel as suggesting the Ali was, in fact, the rightful prophet.52  In view of the 
political environment the issue emerged into, it is understandable that many attempted to 
downplay the issue in the Sunni Arab world. 
When considering the recent controversy over the Danish cartoons much is to be 
learned from the scholarship already available.  Lessons from the Rushdie affair, other events 
in the past, Muslim convictions and the impact of the technological and information 
revolutions on the Arab world all shed a great deal of light on the reactions it received.  For 
these reasons, I shall continue to draw from the information presented above throughout the 
analysis of the current affair.  In conclusion, it must be said that, as Azm asserts:   
[A]s existing Arab societies reach out for development, seek economic 
progress, acquire scientific technical skills and, in the process, shed the old 
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paradigm, Rushdie-like cases will continue to arise -- big and small, local and 
pan-Arab -- with a regularity approaching that of a natural law.53   
 
In this sense the current controversy is a magnified continuation of a long chain of similar 
incidents.  It is only unique in timing, not substance.  Therefore, to explain where we stand 
today we must understand where we stood yesterday.  With this in mind, it is now time to 
investigate the Omani reaction to the Danish cartoon controversy. 
 
 
III. Methodology 
 The aim of this study is to determine how various groups in Oman responded to the 
recent Danish cartoon controversy and why.  Or, to put it more specifically, to address the 
controversy from a number of different perspectives in order to shed light on the similarities, 
differences and relationships among the reactions of different groups in Oman.  Accordingly, 
I approached this study with a variety of research methods.  To do this I divided my research 
into two general groups.  The first consisted of the local professionals -- namely government 
officials, the Danish consulate, religious leaders and retailers -- that were most directly 
involved with the cartoon controversy.  The second group consisted of young Omani males 
ages 15 to 22.  Although it would have been preferable to have the time and resources to 
survey a much larger sample of the Omani population, I believe that by focusing on a much 
more specific group I was able to yield a more accurate representation of the reaction to the 
Danish cartoon controversy within a shorter period of time.  Furthermore, the demographic 
selected is the one that I have the most access to and the one that is the most likely to speak 
out about the issue at hand.   
 In researching the reaction of local elites I used numerous research methods.  All 
research was done through either fieldwork or semi-structured interviews with the local elite.  
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My fieldwork consisted of anything from going to local stores to see if they sold Danish 
butter to reading online newspapers and postings.  By doing this I was attempting to find 
measurable, empirical sets of data that would accurately represent the breadth of the Omani 
reaction.  I also interviewed a number of local professionals involved with the controversy.  
For each interview I would prepare a set of questions appropriate for the individual’s 
position.  My hope was that these questions would provide some direction to the interview 
rather than dictate its emphasis. The aim was thus to allow the informant to provide the 
information that he or she deemed most important and for me to simply get out of the way 
and record.  On occasion, local sensitivities proved to be a hindrance to the success of this 
semi-structured format in which case the interview would take on a more formal structure.  
  In researching the second group I used a similar methodology.  As with this local 
elites, the aim of each interview was to allow the informant to express what he believed was 
most important to this issue.  However, unlike the first group, the Omani youth were given a 
much more structured interview.  Each informant was asked the same 29 questions in the 
same order (see Appendix A for interview questionnaire).  These questions were divided up 
into four distinct sections: general information, the cartoons, the boycott and the outcome.  
Each section is aimed at determining specific perceptions of and experiences with the given 
topic.  By presenting the informants with the same questions I could get a better sense of the 
differences and similarities of opinion and experience within the group.  Furthermore, the 
standardized interview allowed me to probe the informant about a number of topics in a 
manner that was consistent throughout the research period.  This method enabled me to most 
accurately see the commonalities and differences among the informants’ experiences and 
perceptions. 
 Considering the sensitive nature of my topic, I was bound to confront a number of 
obstacles during my research.  The most immediate dilemma I faced was finding informants.  
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Many of the individuals I approached for interviews initially saw my study with a great deal 
of skepticism.  Unfortunately, many people refused to talk to me or would and then refuse to 
answer many of the interview questions.  On one occasion I was even accused of being a 
Danish spy!54  Once this obstacle was evaded I still came into a number of dilemmas.   
First of all, there was always the fact that many of the informants perceived my 
inquiries as threatening.  To resolve this dilemma I tried to frame my study in a manner that 
was as neutral and constructive as possible.  Secondly, the nature of my interviews also made 
them prone to the deference and expectancy effects.  Informants were both apt to answer my 
questions in a manner that they believed I desired and in a manner that I had shaped through 
the interview process.  To avoid these potential dilemmas I attempted to frame the interviews 
in a manner that revealed as little as possible about what my opinions are and what I expected 
to hear.  When informants would ask me for my opinion on a given issue I would defer until 
after the interview was complete so that my answer would not impact their responses.  
Finally, during a few occasions I experienced trouble with the impact of a third-party on the 
interview process.  This dilemma was resolved by simply adjusting the location of the 
interviews to a more private setting.  Fortunately, this solution worked resoundingly well.  In 
the end, I would like to emphasize that although no social study can be conducted without 
researcher bias, I did try my best to limit the impact of my own position on the outcome of 
my research.  
 
IV.  Caricatures of the Omani Reaction 
When attempting to understand the Omani reaction to the Danish cartoon controversy 
I believe it is best to look at the issue from the top-down.  This is because the views of 
individuals within a society are largely shaped by the political, economic and social 
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circumstances in which they live.  Therefore, it is only after understanding the strategies with 
which the government, local elite and the business sector used to handle the issue that one 
can draw an accurate picture of the perspectives and experiences of a population.  Then, with 
both in hand, one can paint a picture of the issue in its entirety. 
 
Section 1: The Omani Elite and the Caricatures of Controversy 
 
 To fully comprehend the Omani response to the Danish cartoon controversy one must 
understand the reaction of the Omani elite.  The Omani government, media, business and 
religious communities’ reactions add an important dimension to our discussion of the Omani 
response.  The response of the Omani elite played an important role in the crisis as it 
unfolded, because their actions helped to create the environment in which the perceptions of 
the Omani youth were formed.  As we shall see, the efforts of the local elite were 
predominately aimed at minimizing the escalation of the controversy in Oman and securing 
economic interests by diminishing popular dissent.   
 Surprisingly, neither the Omani government nor the Omani religious community were 
involved with the Danish cartoon controversy.  Speaking on behalf of the Omani government 
Dr. Mohammed al-Ansari, Assistant Secretary General for Session Affairs at the Majlis Al-
Sura said that “Although I think many people felt strongly about the issue, the government 
made no public statements and did not get involved with the situation.”55  Sheikh Khalfan bin 
Mohammed Al-Esry confirmed this assertion and added that the religious community did the 
same; “The government did not interfere or intervene.  The same goes from a religious angle, 
they did not get involved.”56  Moreover, when asked if he ever mentioned the controversy in 
his sermons Sheikh Khalfan Al-Esry went on to say, “Yes, I told them it was a stupid idea, 
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because it is running away from the reality, it is merely a boycott of convenience.”57  When 
pressed on what he meant Sheikh Khalfan Al-Esry continued, “The boycott does not do 
anything to fix the source of the problem.  How do you love the Prophet?” he rhetorically 
asked, “You emulate his way of life.  The Prophet never would have initiated a boycott.”58  
Although Sheikh Khalfan Al-Esry may have publicly addressed the issue, his message 
advised against popular action in the form of a consumer boycott.  Instead, he encouraged 
Omanis to respond to the Danish caricatures by emulating the life of the Prophet Mohammed 
and his deeds, which he argued would discredit the message the cartoons conveyed far better 
than any consumer boycott.59
 The Danish Consulate in Oman had a similar reaction to the controversy.  When I met 
with Anwar Ali Sultan, the Danish Consul-General, he was quick to summarize the 
environment in Oman in the following manner:  
Oman, unlike other nations in the Muslim world, had a very quiet reaction to 
the cartoons.  No one was in the streets protesting.  No one behaved violently.  
People only peacefully boycotted Danish goods.  As a result, the Omani 
government and the Danish government did not have to do anything, because 
there was nothing to be done.60  
 
Furthermore, when asked about how Danish companies operating in Oman were advised to 
respond to the crisis the Consul-General replied, “There are no Danish businesses in Oman, 
so no Danish companies had any problems.”61  Although this statement is blatantly untrue 
(Cowi & Partners LLC, Nawras, Larsen A&CE, and Maersk Oil Oman BV, for example, are 
all Danish owned and operated and are some of the largest companies in Oman), 62 it reveals 
that the Danish government had a strategy akin to that of the Omani government and 
religious community.  It neither took a proactive stance nor even went so far as to 
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acknowledge the situation.  In a way, all three parties seemed to be abiding to the English 
cliché, “Out of sight, out of mind.”  
The Omani media’s treatment of the controversy is also worthy of consideration.  At 
the international level, the Omani people had access to the same information as every other 
individual with a satellite television.  Omanis were just as conscious of the events occurring 
throughout the world as any other person who is keeps track of the world around them.  
However, the story greatly differs when it comes to the media coverage of the controversy as 
it unfolded in Oman.  In Oman there was scant coverage of the events that occurred.  
Throughout all of my research I was only able to find two articles dealing with the Omani 
response to the Danish cartoon controversy.  Perhaps this was result of my basic 
comprehension of the Arabic language which limited my research to English publications; 
however, considering how widely spoken English is in Oman -- for instance, there is a royal 
decree saying that all signs must be in English as well as Arabic -- I believe that any 
information published in Arabic about this issue would have also been published in English.   
Both the articles I found happened to be from the Times of Oman and published in 
early February.  The first article, entitled “Companies dealing in Danish products worried” (1 
February 2006), is worthy of extensive consideration.  It is the first article published about 
the controversy in Oman and despite its short length, is very telling of how the issue was 
framed within Oman.  For this reason, I feel a large portion of the article deserves 
explication. 
Although there has been no official move to boycott Danish items, especially 
in the wake of the apology by the Danish publication’s editor, those dealing in 
Danish products still fear the worst: a backlash from the consumers.  
 
However, others like Khalid Ehsan, country manager, Arla Foods (Lurpak–
Puck cheese), spoke on a positive note. He highlighted the positive 
 25
movements following the fallout after the cartoon was published and noted 
that the situation would ameliorate in a short span.63
 
Considering that all news coverage of events in Oman are provided by an agency within the 
Ministry of Information, the Omani News Agency (ONA), I view the Omani press coverage 
of the Danish cartoon controversy as an extension of the Omani government’s will.  It 
therefore comes as no surprise how remarkably well this quotation fits into strategy of 
downplaying the issue.  To begin, this article was published on 1 February 2006, which is 
during the first days of the crisis’s escalation and the day following the Danish government’s 
initial apology.  Secondly, the article notes the apology by Jyllands-Posten and qualifies “a 
backlash from the consumers” and the “worst” fear of Danish companies.  It also goes on to 
present Arla Foods in a positive light.  Despite the looming disaster, the company’s country 
manager is said to have “highlighted the positive movements following the fallout…and 
noted that the situation would ameliorate in a short span.”  This degree of optimism astounds 
me.  The favorable tone of the article is hardly what I would expect from a Muslim state 
press.  I also find it extremely significant that in the first article published in the Omani press 
about the issue there is mention of both an apology by the Danish government and of the 
positive aspects Arla Foods, a primary target of the consumer boycott.  The latter article 
compliments these observations. 
The second article, entitled “SQU students rally against blasphemous caricatures” (5 
February 2006), has the same connotations as the first.  The article begins by saying that 
nearly 100 Sultan Qaboos University (SQU) students gathered to protest the Danish 
caricatures portraying the Prophet Mohammed.64  The article notes that the students “not only 
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strongly denounced the cartoons, but also stressed the need to act against the blasphemy.”65  
The article also mentions that leaflets have been dispersed throughout the country and 
suggests that there is a desire to formally ban Danish products in Oman.66  However, the 
article’s focus quickly shifts. The article goes on to highlight the struggles of two companies, 
Nestle and Ferrero, to clarify the fact that they are not Danish.67  Although the article’s varied 
tone and sudden shift in focus make it problematic to make assertions, I still believe that the 
final sentences of this article address the controversy in the same favorable tone as the prior 
one. 
Considering that this issue was both a religious matter and highly politicized at the 
international level, I find the religious and governmental responses worthy of further 
consideration.  In my opinion, each of these parties appear to be downplaying the issue in 
Oman.  Although one can only speculate as to why this may be the case, it seems probable 
that a number of interests were served by pacifying the Omani reaction.  As suggested by 
Said Al-Harthi, Press Secretary for the Embassy of the United States of America:  
Danish business has a lot of influence in the Omani government and economy.  
Denmark is very involved with the airport, telecommunications and even the 
dairy industries.  As a result, to protect the Omani economy from any 
hardships the Omani government tried to be quiet and downplay the event in 
Oman.68   
 
Moreover, one local Imam, who wishes to remain anonymous, confirmed that the Omani 
government instructed imams not to discuss the Danish cartoon controversy during Friday 
prayer.69  Consequently, “No Imams in Oman said anything about the controversy” and the 
religious community never got involved.70  The statements of the Danish Consul-General 
also seem to downplay the issue.  For instance, by asserting “There are no Danish businesses 
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in Oman,” the Consul-General nullified the possibility of protest by eliminating any potential 
targets.  In my opinion the policy of downplaying the controversy in Oman had two distinct 
aims.  Firstly, as noted above, it secured local economic interests tied to Denmark business 
and, secondly, it decreased the likelihood that Oman would experience the mass upheaval 
seen in other nations throughout the region.  Furthermore, by remaining so uniquely pacified 
Oman would reinforce its image as a beacon of stability in a tumultuous region and provide 
further justification for the notion of Omani exceptionalism.  
The Omani business community also had a noteworthy response to the cartoon 
controversy.  In fact, the business sector’s response to the controversy was so complex and 
multifaceted that I believe that it is deserving of a study of equal, if not greater, volume.  
However, for our purposes it is only necessary to summarize the important aspects.  The 
response by the business sector in Oman was not significantly different than the responses 
discussed in section I of this paper.  The Danish companies in Oman most severely impacted 
by the crisis were Danish food producers.  For the most part these companies tried to take a 
low profile or, if possible, publicize their connection to Oman.  Santop juice, for example, is 
a locally produced Danish product.  As the crisis escalated Santop put the label of the Omani 
Products Campaign on its beverages in an attempt to highlight its connection to Oman.71  
Other companies, such as Arla Foods, worked though various international Muslim 
organizations to improve their public relations.72  Over time this strategy proved to be 
successful as their products found their way back on to the shelves of retailers in Oman.73  
The reaction of Omani retailers is also significant.  This group’s response was 
predominately aimed at maximizing their credibility with their Omani customers.  Most did 
this by taking a very proactive stance on the controversy by acting on their customers’ behalf.  
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For instance, Abdul Lateef, Department Head of Consumer Goods at Carrefour, said, 
“immediately after the controversy started [Carrefour] stopped supplying Danish goods, 
because we consider ourselves part of the community.  Anything that we can do to support 
the community, we feel obliged to do.”74  Other retailers, such as Safeer Hypermarket, hung 
signs around their stores informing their consumers of whether or not they were selling 
Danish products and why.75   
In my opinion, this evidence suggests that local retailers took the situation as an 
opportunity to advance their business interests.  By removing Danish products from their 
shelves shortly after the controversy erupted, these retailers promoted their images as pious 
Muslim businesses and, consequently, improved their public reputations.  It would come as 
no surprise to me that Muslim consumers would prefer to shop at a store with similar values 
to their own, over one that took no stance on an issue such as this.  Ultimately, I suspect that 
many retailers sought to tap the controversy for an edge on their competition.  Furthermore, if 
most retailers voluntarily removed Danish products form their shelves as part of a business 
strategy then Omani consumers had to do very little to greatly impact Danish companies.  
With this said, it appears that a large portion of the consumer boycott may have merely been 
a repercussion of businesses looking for an advantage in a perfectly competitive marketplace.  
Nevertheless, as we shall see, all of the young adults interviewed in this study acknowledged 
taking part in the consumer boycott.  Then again, how often do Omani males shop for dairy 
between the ages of 15 and 22? 
 In conclusion, I believe that the efforts of the local elite were predominately aimed at 
minimizing the escalation of the controversy and securing economic interests.  The Omani 
government and religious community attempted to do this by downplaying the issue.  Their 
efforts were largely aimed at staying out of the controversy in the hope that non-intervention 
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would allow Oman to be as least impacted by the fallout of the crisis as possible.  
Conversely, the business community took a very proactive position.  Many local retailers saw 
the crisis as an opportunity to gain on their competition, while many producers saw it as a 
looming catastrophe.  Consequently, both set out on lavish public relations campaigns to 
improve their reputations with Muslim consumers.  With this context in mind it is possible to 
consider the reactions of the Omani youth to the Danish cartoon controversy. 
 
Section 2: The Omani Youth and the Caricatures of Controversy 
 
 The perceptions and experiences of the male Omani youth concerning the recent 
Danish cartoon controversy are complex and multifaceted.  From the research I conducted it 
is clear that there is a wide range in opinions and experiences; yet, it is still possible to find 
general patterns by looking for the similarities and differences among these opinions.  In total 
nine separate interviews were conducted, eight of which were done in a one-on-one format.  
These interviews typically lasted between 30 and 45 minutes and were, by far, my most 
informative research method.  The one remaining interview was a group interview conducted 
in Nizwa with nine local, male residents.76  This was the first interview performed in the 
study and even though much was learned from the session, the format was quickly dropped 
for the more personal one-on-one format.  Although more research may still be done on this 
topic, much can be said about the information conveyed during these interviews.   
From the onset I believe it is essential to identify the means by which the individuals 
interviewed came to know the Danish cartoon controversy.  The majority of the informants -- 
two-thirds -- said they had initially learned about both the cartoons and the boycott by word 
of mouth.  In fact, one informant went as far to say,  
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I heard about it everywhere: friends, family, mosque, everywhere.  It was the 
story at every home.  When you arrive at a house they would not welcome you 
home, but instead they would say, “Do not buy Danish milk!”77   
 
This suggests that the information about the controversy spread most quickly in a highly 
informal, conversational manner; or, to put it differently, the news spread like gossip.  As a 
social scientist, this means the information I collected has two troublesome characteristics.  
First of all, it is nearly impossible to trace the information back to its original source and, 
secondly, it is likely that at some point the information was subject to individual 
interpretation before it got to the informant.  Nevertheless, considering that my aim is to 
determine individual perceptions of the cartoon controversy, my research was not 
substantially impacted by the characteristics of the information I was acquiring.  However, 
not all of the informants initially heard about the controversy through word of mouth.  Two 
of the nine people read about the issue on the Internet via e-mail.78  Furthermore, when the 
informants were asked how they learned about the boycott of Danish goods, three individuals 
said they had received an e-mail listing what companies to boycott.79  This suggests that 
communications technology, namely the Internet, played a major role in the proliferation of 
information concerning the Danish cartoon controversy.  Moreover, a number of the 
informants acknowledged that they subsequently learned more about the controversy on the 
television.  In the end, however, only one of the seventeen total people I discussed the issue 
with had actually seen the Danish cartoons.80
 One informant’s source of information was significantly different than those of the 
others interviewed and, for this reason, I believe it deserves special attention.  This young 
adult had primarily learned about the Danish cartoons, the boycott and the outcome of the 
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boycott through papers handed out during Friday Prayer at his local mosque.81  Not only was 
the mosque the original source of his information concerning the affair, but it also continued 
to be his primary source of information throughout the duration of the crisis.  In his opinion 
the mosque played a central role in the events that unfolded.  According to him, it was the 
“papers given out on Friday prayer, which got the people to stop buying Danish goods, which 
then got the stores to stop selling Danish goods.”82  Considering the response of the Omani 
religious community discussed above, this response seems very out of place; however, it 
must be stressed that he learned about the issue from papers handed out at the mosque and 
from the words of a religious authority figure.  Although this informant was an anomaly in 
the interviews conducted, I think that his experience is no less noteworthy.  If one of the 
informants had this experience others in Oman are bound to have shared it with him.   
 While discussing the Danish cartoons with the Omani youth I came into a number of 
interpretations of the events that unfolded.  First of all, at least four of the informants, a 
strong minority, explicitly stated that the Danish newspaper knew the cartoons would cause 
the massive upheaval that occurred.  For instance, when asked if the newspaper knew that the 
cartoons would receive this reaction one individual strongly replied, “Yes they knew it.”  
When asked why he was so certain the young man continued, “because they did not draw 
something that shows the Prophet as beautiful.  This I know.”83   Another person said that the 
newspaper “wanted to see how the Muslims felt about the Prophet and were just trying to get 
the Muslims to react.”84  A large number of the informants shared these sentiments and 
seemed to believe that Jyllands-Posten’s aim was to provoke the Muslim masses and perhaps, 
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as one person put it, monetarily benefit by the fallout of the crisis.85  However, there turned 
out to be far more to the informants’ interpretations of the controversy than this alone.  
 A second, and interrelated, interpretation I discovered was that nearly all of the 
Omani youth I interviewed perceived the cartoons as an attack on Islam as a whole.  “They 
were talking about all Muslims and not just Osama bin Laden, because they can do pictures 
of Osama bin Laden or Al-Qaeda, but instead they chose to do our Prophet, which insults all 
Muslims,” said one young man.86  Another informant more vehemently put it, “Yes, [the 
cartoons are attacking Islam].  They are trying to prove that we are bad, when they are 
actually bad and when they day comes they will learn this.”87  In my opinion, not only does 
this interpretation provide an ulterior motive for Jyllands-Posten’s publication of the cartoons 
and rationalize the perception explored in the previous paragraph, but it also explains why the 
cartoons were of the Prophet Mohammed in particular.  As shown in section II, many of the 
practices, behaviors and social norms in Muslim societies are founded on the life and deeds 
of the Prophet; therefore, by insulting the Prophet the cartoons struck at many Omanis’ core 
beliefs, values and practices.  Thus, in the eyes of the interviewees, by degrading the figure 
all Muslims desire to emulate, the caricatures were making a commentary on the Muslim 
world as a whole.  In doing so the cartoons managed to alienate a majority of Muslims and 
provoked them into action. 
 In sum, the Omani youth’s views regarding the publication of the Danish cartoons in 
Jyllands-Posten and other publications centered around their perceptions of authorial intent.  
This became most apparent when I asked the informants how they saw Muslim journalists 
who republished the cartoons.  A number of the respondents shared the view that, as one 
person put it, “there is a difference between when Europeans and Muslims published the 
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cartoons, because when Europeans did it they were trying to be humorous and when Muslims 
did it they were trying to show how the religion was being treated.”88 However, some of the 
young men saw the issue very differently.  One person believed that Muslim “journalists 
were wrong [to reprint the cartoons], because it allowed small children to see the 
cartoons…and begin to misunderstand Islam.”89  In spite of this, the same individual saw the 
publication as an attempt to attack and discredit his religion.  In conclusion he said, “[I have 
learned that] they have their own book so why do they want to get into our book?  Why are 
they trying to spoil Islam?”90  Another individual went so far as to say that the “journalists in 
the Middle East who [published the cartoons] were not Muslims, they only published it for 
money.”91  Despite these differences each informant substantiated their views on the bases of 
the publications’ intent in printing the cartoons.  Whether aim was for financial gain, to 
support anti-Islamic views, to inform Muslim populations about the treatment of Islam in the 
Western world, to attack Islam and Muslims alike, or simply because it was the news of the 
day; each informant had strong beliefs regarding the intent and interests served by the 
publication of the Danish cartoons.   
 Investigating Omani perceptions regarding the boycott of Danish goods was also a 
major aspect of this study.  By determining some general pattern in their perceptions my hope 
was to understand how the Omani youth see themselves and their actions in a greater context.  
Accordingly, a large portion of each interview was spent discussing how the informant had 
learned about, participated in and viewed the goals of the boycott of Danish goods.  As noted 
above, one-third of the individuals interviewed acknowledged receiving an e-mail that listed 
which companies to boycott and one of the informants learned about the issue through papers 
handed out at Friday Prayer.  Every person interviewed also disclosed that they had, in fact, 
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participated in the boycott by refusing to purchase Danish products.  Still, only one person 
went beyond the boycott and participated in an online discussion about the controversy with 
other Muslims from around the world.92  What was most telling, however, were the 
informant’s perceptions about the ultimate goals and impact boycott itself. 
 I found two distinct perceptions concerning the goals and impact of the boycott of 
Danish goods.  Each of these perceptions ultimately sheds a great deal of light on the Omani 
understanding of the controversy as a whole.  The first, and most prominent, perception was 
the hope that the boycott would end Muslim humiliation by the Western world.  Many of the 
informants expressed utter desperation about Islam’s current global status and saw the 
boycott as a means to change.  One informant bluntly stated the goals as “to make Denmark 
realize that we won’t just sit and watch them humiliate us, we will stand up for ourselves and 
for our religion.”93  Later in the same interview the informant went on to say that he believed 
the controversy “really showed people that Westerners see [Muslims] as a pile of dirt, …they 
think we are nothing and that they can do anything they want to us.”94  When asked the same 
question another interviewee said that the aim of the boycott was to “keep Denmark out of 
business” and to show them that they cannot survive alone.95  Another young adult shared 
this view and said that the goal of the boycott was “to show Denmark that they cannot 
survive without the Muslim world.  They need our respect.”96   
This sense of humiliation and lack of respect was also sharply expressed when I asked 
how the informants felt the Western world views Islam and the Muslim world.  To this one 
individual said, “the Western world has lost faith in us.  They do not believe in us anymore.  
                                                 
92 Anonymous H, Personal Notes, 2 May 2006. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Anonymous C, Personal Notes, 20 April 2006. 
96 Anonymous G, Personal Notes, 30 April 2006. 
 35
That is why they are making these cartoons.”97  This informant strongly believed that the 
goal of the boycott was to put an end Muslim humiliation by Western society.  When asked 
the same question another young man replied, “they think all Muslims are terrorists.”98  I 
believe this individual saw the consumer boycott as an ideal middle-ground between the 
overly aggressive and hostile acts that create such stereotypes and the complaisant, non-
responsive behavior that permits such incorrect perceptions to exist.  Thus by participating in 
the boycott this individual was standing up against the humiliation of his society in a manner 
that is seen as just by the insulting party.  To many of the individuals interviewed during this 
study the boycott of Danish was both a just and civil response to the disrespect and 
humiliation they faced.  It consequently showed the potential to be an effective means of 
change.  However, one question still remains: whom, exactly, are they trying to change? 
The second widespread perception I discovered while researching the boycott was the 
belief that the Danish government bears ultimate responsibility for the controversy.  Even 
though the informants nearly universally placed blame for the cartoons on the shoulders of 
the artists who drew them, the vast majority of the informants saw the Danish government as 
responsible for everything else, including the publication and the crisis that proceeded.  For 
instance, when asked whom he believed is responsible for the cartoons and their publication 
one young adult said, “The government in Denmark, because they were the one’s who made 
it.”  When asked why he was so certain he replied, “Because the cartoons came from 
Denmark.”99  Another individual expressed a similar view by saying, “The Danish 
government [is responsible for the cartoons and their publication], because they got the 
Danish newspaper to publish the cartoons.  The government controls everything, so if they 
didn’t want the cartoons to be published they wouldn’t have been.”  When asked who bears 
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ultimate responsibility for the reaction the cartoons received the same person was quick to 
assert: “The government of Denmark.”100   
The same informants also quantified the success of the boycott by how much it 
changed the behavior of the Danish government.  When asked if he believed the boycott was 
successful and, if so, what it had achieved one informant replied, “Yes, because at first the 
Prime Minister of Denmark did not want to apologize and then following the boycott the 
government and the magazine apologized.”101  He went on to stress that getting the 
government to change its behavior was the biggest sign of success and the primary goal of the 
boycott.  When asked if the boycott was successful another person said, “Yes, it might force 
Denmark to apologize.”102  Many of the informants shared these views and saw any change 
in the policies or statements of the Danish government as a sure sign of success. 
The perceptions concerning the role of the Danish government add an interesting twist 
to the story.  From what I gathered during this portion of my research I have come to the 
conclusion that the Omani youth have a significant misunderstanding of the power dynamics 
and role of government in Western societies.  As shown above, there was a widespread belief 
that the Danish government had created the cartoons, pushed their publication and failed to 
intervene when the crisis ensued.  The statement that “The government controls everything,” 
in particular, shows a severe unfamiliarity with the division of power that exists in Western 
societies.  Furthermore, it helps to explain why so much of the hostility during the crisis that 
was aimed at the Danish government and not at the newspapers that published the cartoons.  
Perhaps the individuals interviewed see the spheres of Western governments as akin to the 
Omani model and, consequently, see any act by the Danish press as an extension of its 
government’s will.  If these beliefs are as widespread as they appear to be from this study, 
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then it comes as no surprise that such a large portion of Muslim resentment toward Western 
governments is driven by the treatment of the Muslim world in the Western media.    
In the end, I believe that a great deal of the controversy centered on differing values 
regarding the freedom of expression.  As the controversy escalated, for instance, freedom of 
speech became Western actors’ primary alibi and the responsibility to respect religion 
became the Muslim world’s greatest allegation.  For this reason, I feel that it is important to 
understand where the average Omani youth stands on the issue of free speech.  Doing so will 
help to understand the perceptions discussed above, shed light on Omani opinions regarding 
the merits of civil liberties and, ultimately, enhance our picture of the Omani reaction to the 
Danish cartoon controversy.   
The individuals interviewed for this study had mixed views regarding the merits of 
free expression. For example, when asked for his opinion on the argument that the cartoons 
were justified by the right to freedom of expression one informant said, “we as Muslim 
cannot tolerate these kind of things, there is a very thin line between freedom of speech and 
disrespecting others’ religions.  And they crossed that line.”103  Later in the interview the 
informant put it more plainly by rhetorically asking, “Where does freedom of speech come 
when there is religion?  There is not freedom of speech when it comes to religion.”104  
However, when the same individual believed that freedom of speech is compatible with 
Islam.105  Another individual strongly disagreed with this assertion by saying that “[Freedom 
of speech] is a bad idea for culture and religion, especially with Islam.”106  One person went 
even further by saying that “There should not be freedom of speech, because there are lines 
that should never be crossed.”107  Two individuals, however, had significantly different 
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answers to the same questions.  One person had never heard of the term “free speech” and 
after having it explained to him confirmed that he had never come across the concept 
before.108  The second young adult expressed his views on the matter with an entirely 
different rationale.  “In Europe [free speech] is good, but here there is the royal guard who 
can catch you and it is not definitely allowed.  But in Islam free speech is okay.”109  To this 
young man the troubles surrounding the value of free speech in Oman are largely products of 
the government and not necessarily in conflict with the nation’s cultural and religious 
heritage. 
Although this diversity of opinion makes it difficult to formulate generalizations 
about the views of the population as a whole, it is still useful in that it highlights the 
rationales individuals use while justifying their opinions.  Interestingly, one aspect of each 
informants’ rationale was universal: each substantiated his view on the basis of religion.  
Religion was always the deciding factor.  It is possible that the universality of this response 
was partly a result of an expectancy effect in the interview process.  After spending 30 to 45 
minutes discussing the Danish cartoon controversy and its blatant disrespect of Islam, I 
believe the respondents were more likely to allow that topic -- disrespecting religion -- to 
play a larger role in their responses to the questions at the end of the interview.  Nonetheless, 
it is irrefutable that the vast majority of the opinions on free speech were rationalized on the 
basis of religion.   
The two divergent responses also deserve special attention.  The view that the Omani 
government is limiting freedom of expression in Oman helps to explain many of the obstacles 
I encountered while researching this issue.  Firstly, it helps to explain why I had so much 
difficulty recruiting informants and getting them to openly discuss their views on the 
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controversy.110  For example, when one individual was asked why he was hesitant to be 
interviewed he cited the attacks on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 as the beginning of 
the US and Omani government’s crack down on dissent and explained that for his own safety 
it was best to keep quiet.111  Secondly, if such beliefs are widespread it explains why the 
other informant claimed to have never heard of the term “free speech.”  Considering how 
large of an issue free speech currently is, I find it hard to believe that he had never come 
across the concept before.  For this reason, I regard his unfamiliarity with the term with a 
great deal of skepticism. In my opinion, it is likely that he was trying to avoid compromising 
his own interests with the threat of the perception addressed above.    
Although there is a very diverse set of perceptions among the Omani male youth 
regarding the Danish cartoon controversy, there are a number of conclusions we can deduce 
from this study.  Firstly, the Omani youth saw the cartoons as attacking all Muslims and their 
religion and as attempting to provoke them into action.  Secondly, they saw the Danish 
government as chiefly responsible for the controversy and all the ensued.  Thirdly, they felt 
humiliated by the entire fiasco and saw the boycott as a way to end this sentiment.  Finally, 
they saw religion as off limits to free speech.    
 
V. Conclusions and Considerations 
 Throughout my research of both the Omani elite and the Omani rank and file I came 
across one recurring theme: a steadfast belief in Omani exceptionalism.  Both groups strongly 
believed that Oman is, and will continue to be, the regional exception.  Both groups lauded 
Omani tolerance of diversity and believed that Omani religious and cultural values were what 
allowed the nation to remain exceptional.  For instance, Sheikh Khalfan Al-Esry claimed that 
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“Oman is different than other places, there are no rivalries in the religious communities” and 
that “This is because of how Omanis are raised.  Omanis are very peaceful people.”112  One 
of the young adults interviewed expressed a similar belief by saying, “In Oman there are only 
Islamic mosques, never ones divided up by sect.  It is not like in other parts of the Muslim 
world where people look at each other and keep to themselves.  Here everyone prays, works 
and lives together.”113  After concurring with the impact of Oman’s unique religious 
composition, Hamad Rashid al-Musharafi, the Secretary of Information and Media at the 
Majlis al-Sura, added a cultural aspect to the explanation of Omani exceptionalism: “The 
reason there is such little crime in Oman [is because of] the small population with strong 
communal relationships.  Everyone knows everything about everyone; therefore, if anyone 
does anything, everyone will know who did it.”114  Nearly every individual I interviewed 
agreed with the notion of Omani exceptionalism.  It was, by far, the most widespread 
sentiment discovered in this study. 
 Although I am in no position to embrace or dismiss the validity Omani 
exceptionalism, I can conclude from this study that there is much more to the veracity of this 
concept than the unique traits of Omani culture and religion.  In the case at hand, for 
example, the Omani government and religious community both played an exceedingly 
important role in ensuring that the controversy did not escalate.  It shall forever be impossible 
to definitively measure impact of the religious community’s non-involvement on the issue’s 
escalation; however, it is certain that this non-involvement vastly limited the number of 
public forums that individuals could use to discuss the controversy and subsequently 
mobilize.  In fact, I find it remarkable that only one Omani interviewed had learned about the 
Danish cartoons at the mosque.  Conventional wisdom suggests that number would be far 
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larger.  Furthermore, the Omani government’s non-involvement also stopped the issue from 
escalating on a political level.  By not reacting publicly to the crisis the Omani government 
stopped itself from becoming involved in the political fallout that ensued.  Not only did this 
help to reassure Danish companies that Oman was still a safe and stable environment, it also 
helped to prove that the regime was not going to use the issue to bolster its Islamic prowess to 
its citizenry like others regimes around the region.  Ultimately, all parties were served well by 
the Omani response to the Danish cartoon controversy.  
 With a full picture of the recent controversy in mind it is now possible to see it in a 
greater context.  As with similar events in the past, the impact of the information and 
technological revolutions, Muslim convictions and the timing of the recent controversy 
played significant roles in determining how the crisis unfolded.  First of all, although only 
one of the Omani youth had actually seen the cartoons, one-third of the informants said they 
had learned about the boycott online.  Yet despite this access to information and 
communication technology the government’s policy of downplaying the event was still 
extremely effective.  By cutting off public forums of debate, particularly the mosques, the 
government was very successful in limiting the dissemination of information about the event 
in Oman.  Consequently, the government succeeded in limiting the crisis escalation in Oman.   
Secondly, Muslim convictions played an important role in determining the 
perceptions of individuals about the controversy.  As noted above, each informant 
rationalized the merits of free speech on the basis of religion and saw the cartoons as an 
attack on their faith.  Each individual’s interpretation of the event centered on his 
interpretation of his own religion.   
Finally, the timing of the crisis played an exceedingly important role.  Although it is 
unclear what impact international events have on the behavior of individuals, it is clear that 
the current international environment had a significant impact on the crisis as it unfolded 
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throughout the world.  The burning of the Danish embassies in Beirut and Damascus, for 
instance, underscored the tensions between Syria and Lebanon and occurred near the 
anniversary of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri.  Furthermore, the crisis emerged shortly 
following both the January Palestinian elections that saw Hamas rise to power and the 
departure of Ariel Sharon from Israel’s political scene.  Additionally, the controversy arose in 
the midst of an unpopular US-led war in the heart of the Muslim world.  In such an 
international environment it is no surprise that cartoons from an obscure Danish newspaper 
could cause such a calamity.  
 In the end, much can still be learned from the Danish cartoon controversy in Oman.  
There are a number of issues that I have not adequately addressed this study.  A greater 
understanding of these topics would undoubtedly contribute to both our grasp of the Omani 
reaction to the controversy and the knowledge base of Oman in general.  Although there is a 
wide-range of topics worthy of consideration, a small number stand out in my mind:  
(1) To what extent did the Ibadi response deviate from that of the Sunni and 
Shiite reactions?  Did this play a significant role in defining the character 
of the Omani reaction to the caricatures? 
(2) Is there a significant difference in the perceptions of the Danish cartoon 
controversy among the different social groups (Swahili, Lawati, Balushi, et 
cetera) in Oman?  If so, what accounts for these differences? 
(3) What role did businesses play in propagating or minimizing the cartoon 
controversy in Oman?  What impact did business strategy have on the 
overall Omani experience?   
 
A greater understanding of each issue would invaluably contribute to the knowledge base of 
Oman.  Each would shed light on specific aspects of the controversy in a manner that I 
believe would make up for the shortcomings of this study.  I also feel that there are numerous 
topics not thematically related to the Danish cartoon controversy in Oman, but are still in 
need of greater scholarship.  Perhaps most pertinent would be an in depth examination of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs; namely, what its role is in Omani society, its decision-making 
processes and some case studies involving it.  Another important topic that is in need of 
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research is the international political economy of Oman.  Particularly how the nation’s 
economic interests impact its response to international events.  Further knowledge on each of 
these topics would surely provide the coming generations with valuable insight to the 
functioning of Omani society.   
 In conclusion, I believe much is still to be resolved.  The Omani youth displayed a 
large misunderstanding of the Western power relationships, which partly caused them to hold 
resentment toward Denmark as a whole, and not merely the media outlets that published the 
cartoons.  This misunderstanding greatly contributed to the escalation and severity of the 
crisis.  Additionally, many of the Omani youth expressed a desire to productively participate 
in the fallout of the crisis, but with limited mediums for public participation many shared the 
sentiment of one youth when he asked, “What else is there to do?”115  The Muslim youth 
need more access to positive mediums of public participation; otherwise individuals that 
participate in extreme behavior shall forever drive Western conceptions of Muslim 
populations.  Perhaps worst of all, Oman and other non-violent responses may have been 
drowned out in the sea of media coverage highlighting the violent aspects of the 
controversy’s fallout, thereby reinforcing negative stereotypes of the Muslim world in the 
Western conscious.  Unfortunately, I feel that little has been resolved by the conclusion of the 
Danish cartoon controversy.  In my opinion, more accurate information needs to available in 
both the Western and Muslim worlds so that in future incidents all parties will be better 
informed.  This would greatly limit the escalation of such crisis and ultimately create more 
intercultural understanding.   Alas, better information is merely a stepping-stone to greater 
progress; it alone would not suffice.  Nevertheless, with this newfound knowledge we must 
push forward in the hope that progress may be achieved in the future, insha’allah. 
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Appendix A: Youth Questionnaire 
 
Part I:  General Information 
1) How many years old are you? 
2) Are you male of female? 
3) Are you employed, unemployed or a student?  If employed or student, where? 
4) Are you married?  If yes, for how many years?  How many children? 
5) What is your religion? 
6) Are you Swahili, Lawati, Balushi, Omani, ect…? 
 
Part II: The Cartoons 
7) Did you ever see the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed?   
If yes, When?  Where? With whom? How did they make you feel? 
 If no, how did you hear about them? 
8) What do you think caused these cartoons to be published?  Explain. 
9) What message do you think the cartoons conveyed?  Why?  
10) Why do you think the cartoons caused the reaction they did?  
11) Do you think the newspaper knew the cartoons would receive this reaction?  
12) Why do you think the cartoons were published again by other newspapers?  Especially by 
both Muslim and Western journalists?  Is there a difference between the actions of two? 
Why? 
 Was this republication good or bad/justified or unjustified? Why? 
13) Who do you think is responsible for the cartoons and their publication? Why? 
14) Who is responsible for the reaction the cartoons received?  
 
Part III: The Boycott 
15) How did you learn about the boycott of Danish goods? 
16) Did you participate in the boycott?  If yes, why and how did you participate? 
17) Did you protest the Danish cartoons in any other way? If yes, how? 
18) Do you think the boycott was sufficient?  If no, what else needs to be done? 
19) What were the goals of the boycott?  Why?  What will this change? 
20) Do you think this boycott was successful?  If yes, how do you know?  What did it 
achieve?   If not, what else needs to be accomplished? 
 
Part IV: The Outcome 
21) How do you think the Western world views Islam and the Muslim world?  Why? 
22) What effect do you think the cartoon crisis had on Western views of the Muslim world?  
23) What effect do you think the cartoon crisis had on Muslim views of the Western world? 
24) What do you think the Western world learned from the cartoon crisis? Why? 
25) What do you think the Muslim world learned from the cartoon crisis? Why? 
26) What have you learned from the cartoon crisis?  
27) Do you agree with the idea of free speech?  Why or why not?  
28) Do you think anything was solved by cartoon crisis?  Why or why not? 
29) Do you think a similar crisis could happen again?  Why or why not? 
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